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Abstract
Accompanying the success of the radical right and right-wing populistmovements, right-wing alternative onlinemedia have
recently gained prominence and, to some extent, influence on public discourse and elections. The existing scholarship so
far focuses primarily on the role of content and social media distribution and pays little attention to the audiences of right-
wing alternative media, especially at a cross-national level and in the European context. The present paper addresses this
gap by exploring the characteristics of the audiences of right-wing alternative online media. Based on a secondary data
analysis of the 2019 Reuters Digital News Survey, this article presents a cross-national analysis of right-wing alternative
media use in Northern and Central Europe. The results indicate a comparatively high prevalence of right-wing alternative
online media in Sweden, whereas in Germany, Austria, and Finland, these news websites seem to be far less popular.
With regard to audience characteristics, the strongest predictors of right-wing alternative online media use are political
interest and a critical stance towards immigration, accompanied by a skeptical assessment of news quality, in general, and
distrust, especially in public service broadcasting media. Additionally, the use of social media as a primary news source
increases the likelihood of right-wing alternative news consumption. This corroborates the high relevance of social me-
dia platforms as distributors and multipliers of right-wing alternative news content. The findings suggest that right-wing
alternative online media should not be underestimated as a peripheral phenomenon, but rather have to be considered
influential factors for center-right to radical right-leaning politics and audiences in public discourse, with a high mobilizing
and polarizing potential.
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1. Introduction
The first right-wing alternative news websites appeared
as early as the mid-1990s (Conway, Scrivens, & Macnair,
2019). Thus, the phenomenon of so-called right-wing al-
ternative online media, also referred to as hyperparti-
san media, is not new. However, in the past decade—
accompanying, and possibly fueling—the rise of right-
wing populists (Müller & Schulz, 2019), nationalism
(Marwick & Lewis, 2017), islamophobia (Puschmann,
Ausserhofer, Maan, & Hametner, 2016), political po-
larization (Tucker et al., 2018), and right-wing alterna-
tive online media started to gain prominence and, to
some extent, influence on public discourse (Benkler,
Faris, & Roberts, 2018). By successfully tapping into
the opportunity structures of the Internet, these media
websites are believed to disseminate conspiracy theo-
ries and pseudoscience (Starbird, 2017), propagate au-
thoritarian and anti-immigration attitudes (Haller, 2018;
von Nordheim, Müller, & Scheppe, 2019), as well as
foster distrust in elites, traditional media, and soci-
ety (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2018; Schindler, Fortkord,
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Posthumus, Obermaier, & Reinemann, 2018). The lat-
est since the rise of Breitbart News during the 2016 US
Elections, there is a burgeoning scholarship in the US
context. However, in the European context, empirical—
particularly quantitative—studies on these right-wing
news sources are still scarce compared to the research
concernedwith right-wing populism and the radical right.
Despite this, a quickly growing body of research indicates
a high relevance of right-wing alternative online media
in Central and Northern Europe. The overarching major-
ity of the studies present country-specific analyses of
the content, content production, or social media pres-
ence of right-wing alternative online media for countries
such as Sweden (de La Brosse & Thinsz, 2019; Sandberg
& Ihlebaek, 2019), Germany (Frischlich, Klapproth, &
Brinkschulte, 2020; von Nordheim et al., 2019) and
Finland (Noppari, Hiltunen, & Ahva, 2019; Ylä-Anttila,
2018). Studies focusing on the audiences of right-wing
alternative media, as well as cross-national research de-
sign, however, are still rare. In one of these few stud-
ies, Heft, Mayerhöffer, Reinhardt, and Knüpfer (2019)
presented one of the first cross-national analyses con-
cerning the content of right-wing news websites across
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the US.
In another such study, Nygaard (2020) compared inter-
media agenda setting in right-wing alternative and tra-
ditional online news in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.
Considering the societal relevance of the phenomenon,
it is necessary to further improve our understanding of
right-wing alternative online media, specifically, their au-
diences (Rauch, 2019).
This article contributes to the scholarship by looking
into the audiences of right-wing alternative news me-
dia online in Northern and Central Europe. Specifically,
this research seeks to understand the prevalence of right-
wing alternative online news media use in Northern and
Central Europe and the audience characteristics that pre-
dict the use of such media. Based on data from the
2019 Reuters Digital News survey (Newman, Fletcher,
Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2019), this article exam-
ines these topics within the context of Austria, Finland,
Germany, and Sweden. By following a cross-national ap-
proach, the study aims to provide a broader and more
generalizable understanding of right-wing alternative on-
line media. The results indicate a comparatively high
prevalence of right-wing alternative news in Sweden; in
contrast, in Germany, Austria, and Finland, these news
websites seem to be far less popular. Additionally, the re-
sults indicate that the strongest predictors of right-wing
alternative online news use are political interest, a criti-
cal stance towards immigration, the relevance of social
media as a news source, as well as skeptical assessment
of news in general and distrust, especially, in public ser-
vice broadcasting media.
In the next section, the concepts forming the basis of
the study are presented: First, the terminological difficul-
ties in right-wing alternative onlinemedia are addressed;
next, possible predictors of right-wing alternative media
use are discussed on the grounds of previous research.
Thereafter, in the section that follows, the methodolog-
ical approach as well as the operationalization are de-
scribed. Finally, the results are presented and discussed
in the last two sections.
2. Right-Wing Alternative Online Media:
Conceptualizations and Audiences
Overall, “little attention has been paid to right-wing me-
dia as alternative media” (Atton, 2006, p. 574). This
quote is still valid today, and despite the seemingly in-
creasing relevance of alternativemedia channels, further
research on the changing role of these channels is neces-
sary (Holt, Ustad Figenschou, & Frischlich, 2019). In addi-
tion, there is a terminological debate within the schol-
arship of the originary rather left-wing alternative me-
dia, about whether right-wing and, especially, far-right
alternative media actually can be called alternative me-
dia (Rauch, 2019).
2.1. Conceptual and Terminological Obscurity
Currently, there is no generally agreed upon term or defi-
nition of right-wing alternative onlinemedia (Haller, Holt,
& de La Brosse, 2019). Holt (2018, p. 2) argues “that some
of this confusion, at least in terms of scholarly attempts
to come to grips with it, has to do with a discrepancy
between the dominant theories about alternative me-
dia and alternative media as they actually are.” In other
words, there is a gap between the traditional scholarship
of alternative media and the newly relevant media chan-
nels, such as Breitbart and Co., that could potentially also
be studied as alternative media.
Alternative media need always be discussed as a re-
flection of society, since they are a result of the cul-
tural and, thus, temporal environment of society. This
means the attribute ‘alternative’ might be subject to
change over time. For example, the German newspaper
taz evolved as an alternative medium in the 1970s and
was still studied as such in the 1990s (Mathes & Pfetsch,
1991); in contrast, today, it is considered to be a part of
the traditional news media sphere with a left-wing bias.
Similarly, The Huffington Post could, in its initial phase,
be studied as an alternative online medium, whereas to-
day, it is an internationally relevant news website that
employs professional journalists. This shows that it is vi-
tal to view the relationship between traditional newsme-
dia and alternative online media as a continuous scale,
on which each individual outlet may be positioned with
respect to its current status.
As a further consequence of the conceptual debate,
there are a plethora of terms employed to describe
right-wing alternative online media, e.g., far-right me-
dia (Rauch, 2019), anti-elitist alternative media (Müller
& Schulz, 2019), and populist alternative media (Holt &
Haller, 2017). However, it is not always clear whether or
not they refer to the same phenomenon. Some termino-
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logical differences are rooted in minor conceptual differ-
ences. For instance, von Nordheim et al. (2019) differen-
tiate between reactive and autonomous media, that is,
between media that simply react and comment on tra-
ditional media content and those that genuinely oper-
ate on their own topical agenda. There are also country-
specific differences: For example, in Sweden, the term
immigration-critical alternative media (Nygaard, 2019)
is preferred, whereas, in Finland, right-wing alterna-
tive news websites are referred to as populist counter-
media websites (Noppari et al., 2019). It can be assumed
that, to some extent, these terms were created to cir-
cumvent the term right-wing alternative media on ac-
count of the open terminological debate about its use.
However, the applicability of these more specific terms
remains under debate in the absence of further content-
specific analyses.
After a broader discussion of different aspects of
(right-wing) alternative online media, Holt et al. (2019,
p. 3) proposed an overarching definition in favor of
the concept of alternative media: “Alternative news me-
dia represent a proclaimed and/or (self) perceived cor-
rective, opposing the overall tendency of public dis-
course emanating from what is perceived as the dom-
inant mainstream media in a given system.” In light of
the conceptual difficulties concerning right-wing alter-
native online media, this paper has adopted this gen-
eral conceptualization.
2.2. Audiences of Right-Wing Alternative Online Media
Right-wing alternative media are, compared to tradi-
tional news media, rather small with respect to their
reach. Still, someaudiences consider them relevant news
sources because alternative media present niche top-
ics, voices, and opinions that are not covered by tradi-
tional news media (Rauch, 2015). In particular, in the
wake of recent societal crises, such as the financial cri-
sis and the refugee crisis, the relevance of right-wing
alternative media has been growing in Europe (Haller
et al., 2019). Thus, alternative onlinemedia receive a cer-
tain share of audience. It is unclear, though, how many
people (approximately) are aware of or follow right-
wing alternative news websites, and how these numbers
vary across countries in Europe. Consequently, Research
Question 1 is:
RQ 1: How prevalent are right-wing alternative online
media in Northern and Central Europe?
To increase the understanding and discussion of the
prevalence, it is necessary to study the audiences of
right-wing alternative news websites and their charac-
teristics. Most audience-related research so far either
studied audiences of rather left-leaning, activist alter-
native media audiences (e.g., Downing, 2003; Rauch,
2007), audience engagement with social media accounts
of right-wing media (e.g., Larsson, 2019; Sandberg &
Ihlebaek, 2019), or characteristics of populist audiences
(e.g., Fawzi, 2019; Schulz, 2019). A few, very recent publi-
cations study the audiences of right-wing alternative on-
line media, however, only on the basis of single-country
analyses (Müller & Schulz, 2019; Noppari et al., 2019;
Rauch, 2019). The link and “the interactions between
right-wing alternative media and their audiences require
urgent examination” (Rauch, 2019, p. 34). Therefore, the
main topic of interest of this study is the individual-level
characteristics that predict right-wing alternative online
media consumption across Northern and Central Europe.
It has been shown that in these areas, specifically, the
rise of right-wing populist parties was accompanied by
an increase in right-wing alternative news websites and
their contents (Bachl, 2018; Holt, 2019; Ylä-Anttila, 2018).
Thus, the second research question is as follows:
RQ2: Which recipient characteristics predict the use
of right-wing alternative online media?
Below, potentially relevant characteristics are discussed
on the basis of previous research concerning the au-
diences, as well as the conceptualizations of right-
wing alternative news websites. The discussion of the
audience characteristics is organized with regard to
three dimensions: political and populist, news use, and
news assessment.
2.2.1. Political and Populist
In general, political interest is a relevant predictor of
news consumption (Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre, & Shehata,
2013).More precisely, Tsfati and Cappella (2003) showed
that political interest is associated with both, traditional
and nonmainstream, news use. Therefore, it is assumed
that an interest in politics is a basic prerequisite for
the use of alternative news media, since they predomi-
nantly present and discuss political news. This leads to
the first hypothesis:
H1a: Political interest is associated with a higher like-
lihood of right-wing alternative online media use.
The hybridmedia structure of the Internet offers an ideal
foundation for the populist communication logic, and the
scholarship of populist communication has considered
alternative online media as relevant distribution chan-
nels for populist messages (Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson,
2017). However, at present, there is relatively little evi-
dence on how far right-wing populist politicians actively
employ alternative media for their cause. Bachl (2018)
analyzed media sources shared on the Facebook pages
of Germany’s right-wing populist party and found a high
level of presence of channels linked to the right-wing
alternative media sphere. Müller and Schulz (2019) dif-
ferentiated between occasional and frequent alterna-
tive news use and found that populist attitudes linked
to right-wing ideology increase the probability of reg-
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ular right-wing alternative news use. Similarly, Stier,
Kirkizh, Froio, and Schroeder (2020) showed that people
with populist attitudes consume alternative news media
more frequently. This is reflected in the next hypothesis.
H1b: Support of right-wing populist topics and atti-
tudes is associated with a higher likelihood of right-
wing alternative online media use.
Accordingly, based on the selective exposure theory, it
can be assumed that proponents of right-wing populist
ideas prefer media channels that support their beliefs
(and provide attitude-consistent information) over those
that challenge them and, thus, preferably follow right-
wing alternative media that present familiar interpretive
schemes (Hart et al., 2009). Based on news users’ prefer-
ence for attitude-consistent information, it is expected
that the users of right-wing alternative news websites
would also exhibit right-wing attitudes, as stated in the
following hypothesis.
H1c: Political right-wing orientation is associated with
a higher likelihood of right-wing alternative onlineme-
dia use.
2.2.2. News Use
An analysis of the news media repertoires of right-wing
alternative news users indicated a comprehensive news
diet, specifically with respect to online news sources
(Schulze & Hölig, 2020). Therefore, considering that the
content of right-wing alternativemedia is usually focused
primarily on political news (Holt, 2017), it is assumed that
a general interest in the news is an essential prerequisite
for interest in alternative news media and their content.
Thus, similar to the hypothesis on the role of political in-
terest, the following hypothesis focuses on the role of
news interest.
H2a: News interest and, thus, news use frequency is
associated with a higher likelihood of right-wing alter-
native online media use.
Simultaneously, it can be assumed that right-wing al-
ternative news users turn to alternative news, in or-
der to avoid traditional news content that does not
align with and represent their political beliefs or topics
of interest. Intentional news avoidance as an assump-
tion of selective exposure theory is empirically more
complex and more contested than the assumption of
attitude-consistent information-seeking (Garrett, 2009).
However, several studies showed that right-wing audi-
ences, in particular, prefer and build ideologically aligned
media repertoires by intentionally avoiding opposing
news sources (Benkler et al., 2018; Rauch, 2019). Thus,
while highly interested in political news, audiences of
right-wing alternative media employ right-wing alterna-
tive media as an alternative news source actively, which
allows them to actively avoid traditional news sources.
This forms our next hypothesis.
H2b: News avoidance is associated with a higher like-
lihood of right-wing alternative online media use.
Social media use, and especially Facebook and Twitter
use, was found to increase the probability of right-
wing alternative news consumption (Müller & Schulz,
2019). Further, a comparison of audience engagement
among followers of alternative and traditional news on
social media showed that alternative news audiences
are more active with respect to their commenting and
liking behaviors as well as the distribution of contents
to their followers (Larsson, 2019; Sandberg & Ihlebaek,
2019). Alternative media efficiently use social media to
distribute their content to audiences who, otherwise,
would not come in contact with it. Consequently, peo-
ple who use social media as a (primary) source of news
might have a higher probability of being exposed to dif-
ferent online news sources, including alternative news,
as explained in the next hypothesis.
H2c: Use of social media as the main news source,
as well as the use of social media channels to access
news, is associated with a higher likelihood of right-
wing alternative online media use.
2.2.3. Skepticism and Distrust
One feature that all alternative media “have…in com-
mon: The people who are moved to produce and access
suchmedia tend to feel that their interests, perspectives,
communities, and indeed their very selves are (at best)
inadequately represented within most mainstream me-
dia” (Harcup, 2016, p. 20). Similarly, Holt et al. (2019)
argue that the overarching characteristic of alternative
online media is their (self-) perceived corrective. That
is, alternative media are critical of the general public
discourse, and this is reflected in their critical stance
towards traditional media, which are perceived as the
main driver of the general public discourse. This is fre-
quently accompanied by skepticism towards, and may
sometimes even result in distrust in, traditional media,
depending on the specific news medium (Holt, 2018).
Accordingly, Tsfati and Cappella (2003, p. 504) showed
that “media skepticism is negatively associated with
mainstream news exposure but positively associated
with nonmainstream news exposure.” This is summed up
in the next hypothesis.
H3a: The tendency to critically assess traditional news
media is associated with a higher likelihood of right-
wing alternative online media use.
With regard to the link between trust and media con-
sumption, several studies show that trust in news media
and alternative news consumption are negatively corre-
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lated. Followers of alternative media, generally, show a
lower level of trust in news and traditional media (Tsfati
& Peri, 2006), and people with such low trust levels often
prefer alternative news sources (Fletcher & Park, 2017).
Distrust in media seems to be exceptionally high in po-
litically extreme people; that is, it seems to be higher
in people who expressively lean left or right (Otto &
Köhler, 2016).
H3b: Trust in news media, in general, is negatively as-
sociated with right-wing alternative online media use.
However, contrary to previous research, Kalogeropoulos,
Suiter, Udris, and Eisenegger (2019) found that alter-
native news use was positively correlated with trust
in the news. Specifically, a low level of trust was only
observed in respondents who also used social media
as the primary news source. This means that the con-
cept of distrust in right-wing alternative online media
users needs to be understood at a finer level. In addi-
tion to their support of right-wing populist ideas, it is
expected that alternative news users distrust not only
legacy news media but also public service broadcasting
news (PSB), of which they are highly critical, since they
perceive these media as an extension of the general pub-
lic discourse as well as a biased loudspeaker for elite
opinions that they oppose (Noppari et al., 2019; Rauch,
2019). In contrast, it has been shown that populist au-
diences frequently consume tabloid news (Fawzi, 2019;
Schulz, 2019) and that some right-wing alternative web-
sites strategically mimic tabloid news styles (Farkas &
Neumayer, 2020). Hence, we assume a positive associa-
tion between trust in tabloid news and right-wing alter-
native news consumption.
H3c: Trust in PSB and legacy news is negatively associ-
ated, whereas trust in tabloid news is positively asso-
ciated with right-wing alternative online media use.
3. Method
A secondary data analysis of the 2019 Reuters Digital
News Survey was performed to explore the questions
and hypotheses of the present study. The Reuters Digital
News Survey (Newman et al., 2019) is a cross-sectional
online survey, supervised by the Reuters Institute for the
Study of Journalism, which aims at gathering data onme-
dia and news consumption behavior. Sampling is carried
out at the country level by using representative quotas
for the variables gender, age, education, and region. In
addition, the data are weighted according to the census.
Due to the method used for data collection, people who
never or hardly ever use the Internet are underrepre-
sented. The results are, therefore, representative of all
Internet users of a country who use the Internet at least
once a month.
In 2019, the survey was conducted in 38 countries
in the period January to February 2019. This study fol-
lows a cross-national approach that provides a broader
understanding of right-wing alternative news consump-
tion. The questionnaire differs between countries: (1) In
some countries, the alternative news websites chosen
for the survey show certain country-specific peculiarities
and thus, comparison across these countries is difficult.
(2) In some other countries, for example, Denmark and
Switzerland, the surveys do not include questions that
are relevant for this study. As a result of these limitations
and the conceptual difficulties discussed in Section 2,
this study focuses on countries that are structurally sim-
ilar and for which the surveyed alternative news me-
dia can be compared to ensure equivalence. Accordingly,
the countries chosen for analysis are Germany, Austria,
Sweden, and Finland. In all of these countries, right-
wing alternative news websites seem to be of high rele-
vance, accompanied by the electoral successes of right-
wing populist parties (Fletcher, 2019). In addition, al-
beit minor structural differences, these four countries
share many characteristics and belong to the same me-
dia system type, namely, the democratic corporatist
model (Hallin &Mancini, 2004). Their similarities include,
for example, strong public-service broadcasting systems,
high numbers of newspaper circulation, as well as a
high degree of professionalization of the newspapermar-
kets. Furthermore, a recent empirical re-characterization
of the media system typology has introduced a north-
ern media type (represented by Sweden and Finland)
and a central media type (represented by Germany and
Austria; Brüggemann, Engesser, Büchel, Humprecht, &
Castro, 2014).
With regard to the Reuters data, the sample sizes are
similarly large, and the samples for these four countries
are rather similar in terms of the sociodemographic vari-
ables gender and age (see Table 1).
Table 1. Sample overview per country.
Country N Gender Age
Austria N = 2010 m = 48.5% f = 51.5% M = 47.8 (SD = 15.9)
Germany N = 2022 m = 48.6% f = 51.4% M = 48.3 (SD = 15.8)
Finland N = 2009 m = 48.8% f = 51.2% M = 48.3 (SD = 16.6)
Sweden N = 2007 m = 49.8% f = 50.2% M = 48.8 (SD = 17.5)
Total N = 8048 m = 48.9% f = 51.1% M = 48.3 (SD = 16.5)
Notes: The numbers are weighted. Source: Newman et al. (2019).
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3.1. Dependent Variable: Usage of Right-Wing
Alternative Online Media
For data on the dependent variable, usage of right-wing
alternative online media, respondents were asked for
a list of news websites that they had (1) heard of and
(2) had used to access news in the last week. Only alter-
native news websites to which a right-wing bias could be
attributed were included in the analysis. The bias attribu-
tion was based on previous studies, such as for Germany
(Bachl, 2018; Müller & Schulz, 2019; Puschmann et al.,
2016), Austria (Heft et al., 2019; Newman, Fletcher,
Kalogeropulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018), Sweden (Heft
et al., 2019; Holt, 2019; Sandberg & Ihlebaek, 2019), and
Finland (Noppari et al., 2019; Ylä-Anttila, 2018).
Table 2 presents a country-specific overview of all
alternative news websites, including the number of re-
spondents who stated they had used each medium. The
dependent variable right-wing alternative online media
usage was created by aggregating the responses to the
media use question and recoding it into a binary variable.
The variable thus derived indicates, for each respondent,
whether the person had used at least one of thewebsites
listed in Table 2 during the past week or not.
The subsequent sections describe the operationaliza-
tion of the individual-level predictor variables.
3.2. Predictors: Political and Populist
For the evaluation of political interest as a predictor of
right-wing alternative onlinemedia use, the respondents
were asked to rate three variables as measures of the
level of support for right-wing populist attitudes. They
rated the following three variables on a five-point Likert
scale (single item) ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to
‘strongly agree’: (1) immigration-critical (the correspond-
ing statement was ‘Immigration threatens our national
culture’), (2) external efficacy (the corresponding state-
ment was ‘Most elected officials don’t care what peo-
ple like me think’), and (3) support of direct democracy
Table 2. Overview of usage of right-wing alternative media websites.
Country Medium Website Social Media Accounts Number of Users (in %)
Austria
Unzensuriert unzensuriert.at YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, VK 81 (4.0)
Info Direkt Info-direkt.eu YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, 41 (2.0)
Twitter, VK
Alles Roger? www.allesroger.at Facebook 32 (1.6)
Contra Magazin Contra-magazin.com YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, VK 31 (1.5)
Finland
MV-Lehti mvlehti.net Facebook, VK 80 (4.0)
Nykysuomi nykysuomi.com Youtube, Facebook, Twitter, VK 47 (2.3)
Kansalainen kansalainen.fi YouTube, Facebook, Twitter 44 (2.2)
Magneettimedia magneettimedia.com YouTube, Facebook, Instagram 30 (1.5)
Oikea Media oikeamedia.com YouTube, Facebook,Twitter 30 (1.5)
Germany
Junge Freiheit jungefreiheit.de YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, 63 (3.1)
Twitter, Pinterest
RT Deutsch deutsch.rt.com YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, 58 (2.9)
Twitter, VK
Compact Online compact-online.de YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, 51 (2.6)
Twitter, VK
Epoch Times epochtimes.de YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, 41 (2.0)
Twitter, VK
Politically Incorrect pi-news.net YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, VK 39 (1.93)
Sweden
Nyheter Idag nyheteridag.se YouTube, Facebook, Twitter 216 (10.7)
Fria Tider www.friatider.se YouTube, Facebook, Twitter 205 (10.2)
Samhällsnytt samnytt.se YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, VK 175 (8.7)
Ledarsidorna ledarsidorna.se YouTube, Facebook, Twitter 146 (7.2)
Samtiden samtiden.nu YouTube 120 (6.0)
Nya tider nyatider.nu YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, 119 (5.9)
Twitter
Det goda samhället detgodasamhallet.com Facebook, Twitter 77 (3.8)
Notes: The numbers are weighted. Source: Newman et al. (2019).
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(the corresponding statement was ‘The people should
be asked whenever important decisions are taken’). The
third variable is based on the notion of the sovereignty
of the will of the people (Fletcher, 2019).
The degree to which respondents can be considered
to be politically right-leaning (slightly, fairly, or very right-
wing) was based on their self-placement on a six-point
scale ranging across ‘very left-wing,’ ‘center,’ and ‘very
right-wing.’
3.3. Predictors: News Consumption
The variable news use frequencywas rated on a ten-point
scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘more than ten times a day.’
News interestwas rated on a five-point scale from ‘not at
all interested’ to ‘extremely interested.’ For the variable
news avoidance, respondents were asked whether they
were actively trying to avoid news (with the options be-
ing ‘often, sometimes, occasionally, never’). The variable
social media for news represents a count aggregate of all
social media channels a respondent had claimed to use
for news. The main news source was determined from a
list of eleven different news sources, including the items
‘social media’ and ‘blogs,’ which were used to create the
binary variable social media as the main news source.
3.4. Predictors: News Assessment
News skepticism comprised four different items that
were rated on a five-point Likert scale (‘strongly disagree’
to ‘strongly agree’) and aggregated (slightly different for
each country, Cronbach’s α ranged from 0.7 to 0.8). Of
the four items, the first three items were reversed to
match the direction of the variable: (1) ‘news media
monitor and scrutinize powerful people and businesses,’
(2) ‘news media keep me up to date about what’s going
on,’ (3) ‘newsmedia helpme understand the news of the
day,’ and (4) ‘topics chosen by the newsmedia do not feel
relevant to me.’
The overall stance towards the traditional news me-
dia within a country, indicated by the variable trust in
news, was based on the respondents’ response to how
much they trusted the news as a whole within their
country (with the responses ranging from ‘strongly dis-
agree’ to ‘strongly agree’). To discuss the (lack of) trust
in greater detail, the variables trust PSB, trust tabloid,
and trust legacy were included as predictors. These vari-
ables were recoded for each country individually, based
on the respondents’ ratings of the trustworthiness of a
list of several news media on a ten-point scale ranging
from ‘not at all trustworthy’ to ‘completely trustworthy.’
4. Results
4.1. Prevalence of Right-Wing Alternative Online Media
Overall, there were a total of 8048 respondents from
Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Finland. However, only
931 (11.6%) reported having accessed thewebsites listed
in Table 2 to use news within the past seven days. Of
these, the overarching majority (576/931, 61.9%) had
accessed only one of the listed channels, and merely
355 (4.4%) respondents had visited two ormore of these
websites within the past week.
Figure 1 presents the country-specific prevalence
of right-wing alternative online media use in terms of
the percentage of respondents who had either heard
of (Awareness) and/or accessed (Usage) these media.
With regard to usage, Sweden stands out: While the
share of users is relatively similar (8%) across Austria,
Austria
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Figure 1. Prevalence of right-wing alternative online media usage.
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Finland, and Germany, the Swedish websites have nearly
as many users as Austria, Finland, and Germany com-
bined (22.5%). With regard to awareness, two groups
appear: In Austria and Germany, 20–25% stated that
they had heard of such media, whereas in Finland and
Sweden, farmore than half of the respondents had heard
of these websites. When awareness and usage are com-
pared, a large gap can be observed in each country.
Unsurprisingly, the number of people who are aware of
the existence of such websites is far greater than the
number of people actually using them. The difference is
especially pronounced for Finland, where the number of
people who have heard of right-wing alternative online
media is seven times more than the number of people
using such media.
4.2. Predictors of Right-Wing Alternative Media
Consumption
For the subsequent analyses, the data from all countries
were entered into one model. The predictors of alter-
native media consumption were modeled using a fixed-
effects binomial logistic regression. The fixed-effect ap-
proach is suitable when there are country-level differ-
ences in hierarchical data, andmultilevel modeling is not
possible (Möhring, 2012).
The country-level differences are represented by
N−1 dummy variables, with N being the number of coun-
tries in the model. Dummy variables were created for
Germany, Austria, and Finland, while Sweden is repre-
sented by the Intercept. The null model included only
these country-level dummy variables and, thus, repre-
sents the variance in the model stemming from country-
level differences. The Pseudo R2 values range from .01
to .08 and, thus, show that the share of variance at the
country level is between 1% and 8%.
Prior to the regression analyses, the data were as-
sessed for missing values via a missing map and cross-
tabulations. The findings showed that only the vari-
able political right-leaning might have been affected
by a systematic nonresponse bias, since a few respon-
dents (15.5%) preferred not to answer the question.
Furthermore, no specific outliers or individual cases that
would have to be deleted were identified.
The results of the binomial logistic regression are pre-
sented in Table 3.
Table 3. Results of binomial logistic regression.
95% CI for odds ratio
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper
Intercept −1.24 (0.05)*** 0.12 0.14 0.17
Political & Populist
Political Interest 0.58 (0.07)*** 1.56 1.79 2.05
Immigration-critical 0.57 (0.06)*** 1.57 1.78 2.01
External Efficacy −0.12 (0.05)** 0.80 0.89 0.99
Support of Direct Democracy 0.01 (0.05) 0.91 1.01 1.12
Political Right-leaning −0.02 (0.05) 0.89 0.98 1.07
News Consumption
News Use Frequency 0.18 (0.05)*** 1.08 1.20 1.33
News Interest 0.15 (0.07)** 1.02 1.16 1.33
News Avoidance 0.18 (0.05)*** 1.09 1.20 1.31
Social Media for News 0.42 (0.04)*** 1.40 1.52 1.64
Social Media as Main News Source 0.46 (0.14)*** 1.20 1.59 2.10
News Assessment
News Skepticism 0.30 (0.05)*** 1.21 1.35 1.49
General Trust News −0.03 (0.05) 0.87 0.97 1.08
Trust PSB −0.51 (0.07)*** 0.52 0.60 0.69
Trust Tabloid 0.28 (0.06)*** 1.18 1.33 1.49
Trust Legacy −0.14 (0.07)* 0.76 0.87 1.01
Control Variables
Age −0.07 (0.05) 0.85 0.94 1.03
Gender 0.47 (0.10)*** 1.32 1.60 1.94
DAustria −1.38 (0.12)*** 0.20 0.25 0.32
DFinland −.161 (0.14)*** 0.15 0.20 0.26
DGermany −1.39 (0.13)*** 0.19 0.25 0.32
Notes: R2 = 0.32 (Cox & Snell), 0.52 (Nagelkerke), 0.45 (McKelvey & Zavoina). Model 𝜒2 (20) = 1481, p < .001.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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In order to aid understanding, the variables were
ordered according to the following underlying con-
cepts: Political and Populist, News Consumption, News
Assessment, and Control Variables. Continuous variables
were z-standardized to ensure the comparability of the
effect sizes and the odds ratio values. The test for mul-
ticollinearity of the variables via a calculation of the
variance inflation factors presented satisfactory results
(all VIF values < 3.5). Overall, a distinct improvement
from model 0 to model 1 can be observed. After all the
explanatory variables were included in the model, the
share of variance, according to the Pseudo R2 values, was
between 32% and 52%.
Figure 2 presents a visualization of the effect sizes
of all significant predictors of right-wing alternative on-
linemedia usage in descending order of odds ratio values
(Bates, 2020; Lüdecke, 2018; RStudio, 2020).
With regard to the individual-level characteristics
that predict the probability of usage of right-wing alter-
native online media, interest in political topics (H1a), a
critical stance towards immigration (H1b, partially), the
relevance of social media as news a source (H2c), a skep-
tical assessment of news quality in general (H3a), and
lack of trust in public service broadcasting media (H3c)
emerged as the strongest predictors based on the effect
sizes. In contrast, support for the sovereignty of the peo-
ple (direct democracy; H1b), as well as right-wing politi-
cal attitudes (H1c), were not predictors of the probabil-
ity of usage of alternative online news sources. Further,
while a critical reflection of news, in general, could be
confirmed, we did not find evidence that a general dis-
trust in the news was predictive of alternative news con-
sumption (H3b). The factor external efficacy was found
to be a significant predictor of the probability of right-
wing alternative online media usage. However, contrary
to our expectations, the direction was reversed; this in-
dicates a low level of support for the statement ‘Most
elected officials don’t care what people like me think.’
5. Discussion
The results of the analyses above present new insights
concerning two aspects of right-wing alternative online
media in Northern Europe (represented by Finland and
Sweden) and Central Europe (represented by Germany
and Austria): (1) the general prevalence of such media
and (2) the audience characteristics that explain right-
wing news consumption.
The results of the prevalence of right-wing alterna-
tive onlinemedia showed a large gap between the aware-
ness and the actual usage of thesewebsites. The fact that
approximately 20% to 53% of the respondents stated
that they had heard of these websites proves a con-
sistent presence of right-wing online media in the pub-
lic discourse, probably facilitated by either traditional
news websites or social media platforms. Of course,
far fewer people actually use right-wing websites to in-
form themselves about political issues. However, the fact
that supposedly small niche, hyperpartisan media are
able to reach approximately 8% to 23% of people who
read the news indicates that right-wing alternative on-
line media are fairly successful in distributing their con-
tent and reaching potential audiences. For Germany, a
similar survey-based study found even higher numbers
for occasional usage of right-wing websites (Müller &
Schulz, 2019). The country-specific comparison of the
reach points out a comparatively high popularity of right-
wing online media in Sweden. In contrast, in Germany,
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Figure 2. Odds ratio values for significant predictors.
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Austria, and Finland, these news websites seem to be
less prevalent. A possible explanation for this is related
to the topic of immigration: In proportion to its popu-
lation, Sweden accommodated the highest number of
refugees in Europe in 2015. Simultaneously, the radical
right successfully framed the topic in such a way that,
despite high levels of trust in media, the majority of
Sweden’s citizens had the impression that traditional me-
dia presented biased reporting that was considered too
immigrant-friendly and instead turned to right-wing me-
dia (de La Brosse & Thinsz, 2019). The above presented
analysis of the audience characteristics corroborates the
high relevance of an immigration-critical stance for right-
wing alternative online media usage.
The analysis of the audience characteristics that pre-
dict the usage of right-wing alternative online media fur-
ther emphasizes the significance of these websites. The
results indicate that political interest, as well as a criti-
cal stance towards immigration, are the strongest pre-
dictors of right-wing alternative news use. This is sup-
ported by previous research that showed that criticism
of immigrants and immigration-related policies were
the central theme of right-wing media (Nygaard, 2019;
von Nordheim et al., 2019). Concerning the other items
that are linked to right-wing populist attitudes, the re-
sults are mixed. Neither the support for direct democ-
racy nor right-wing political orientation seems to be rel-
evant right-wing alternative news consumption. Müller
and Schulz (2019) found that the significance of such
right-wing political attitudes is directly related to the
frequency of exposure to right-wing alternative news
and can only be confirmed for frequent exposure, but
not for occasional usage. Therefore, with regard to the
present findings, it is possible that the operationalization
of ‘having visited a news medium within the past week’
is rather representative of occasional alternative news
users. With respect to the political orientation two ex-
planations are possible: (1) The insignificance of ‘right-
wing attitudes’ might be a result of nonresponse bias,
as 15% of the respondents preferred not to answer the
question concerning their political leaning; on the other
hand, (2) it is plausible that alternative media are able
to engage audiences also from the political center via
social media platforms. It has been shown that right-
wing alternative online media are very successful in dis-
tributing their content via social media (Larsson, 2019;
Sandberg & Ihlebaek, 2019), and the results of the audi-
ence characteristics indicate that using social media for
news increases the likelihood of alternative online me-
dia consumption.
In addition, the results of the audience characteris-
tics imply that a certain discontent with the general dis-
course driven by traditional news sources increases the
likelihood of alternative online news consumption.While
the difference in the predictive value of a critical reflec-
tion of news, in general (which was confirmed as a pre-
dictor) and a general distrust in the news (which was re-
jected as a predictor), might be a consequence of the
divergent exposure to alternative news media. Possibly,
the level of (dis)trust varies with respect to the inten-
sity or frequency of consumption of alternative news.
However, the more specific hypotheses concerning dis-
trust in legacy news as well as public service broadcast-
ing could be proven, and the results indicate that people
who intentionally engage in news avoidance behavior are
more likely to follow right-wing alternative online media.
Similarly, trust in tabloid news, which can be linked to
populist attitudes (Fawzi, 2019; Schulz, 2019), can be con-
firmed as a positive predictor. In fact, the heterogeneous
results for news assessment are corroborated by stud-
ies from Figenschou and Ihlebæk (2018, 2019), who have
shown that right-wing alternative media employ several
dimensions of media criticism.
This study has a few limitations which have to be
addressed. While the hypotheses and analyses indicate
causal relationships that, to some extent, should apply,
cross-sectional data are, of course, only suited to a lim-
ited extent to uncover causal mechanisms. For example,
a critical stance towards traditional news media can be
both the origin but also a result of these media channels.
It may be the origin because distrust is one of the cen-
tral reasons for skeptical producers and recipients to en-
gagewith alternativemedia. It may also be a result, since
thesemedia channels frequently present reasons for and
thus, may initiate or reinforce media skepticism, distrust,
or possibly even cynicism.
Furthermore, each large-scale cross-national sur-
vey program, such as the Reuters Digital News Survey,
has limited space for items in the questionnaire.
Consequently, the researcher is bound to rely on the in-
cluded items for their analyses. In this case, it certainly
would have been useful to have included amore compre-
hensive selection of alternative news websites, a more
diverse elicitation of the respective consumption inten-
sity, as well as a more established scale for populist
items. For example, the anti-elite dimension, as a cen-
tral element of populism, is not included in the question-
naire. Concerning the dependent variable, right-wing al-
ternative media use, it is unclear to what extent politi-
cally more extreme and active followers of right-wing al-
ternative media would participate in a survey such as
the Reuters Digital News Survey. It is conceivable that
right-wing alternative news audiences who profoundly
reject the general political discourse might refuse partic-
ipation in such a survey. Thus, with regard to the polit-
ically extreme members of the audience, nonresponse
bias is plausible.
6. Conclusions
Previous research of right-wing alternative online me-
dia focused primarily on the role of content and social
media distribution and paid little attention to the au-
diences of right-wing alternative media, especially at a
cross-national level. This paper addressed this gap by ex-
ploring the prevalence of right-wing alternative online
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media, as well as the audience characteristics that ex-
plain the usage of such websites. Drawing on the 2019
Reuters Digital News Survey, this article presented a
cross-national analysis of right-wing alternative online
media use in Northern and Central Europe.
The results show that the prevalence of right-wing al-
ternative online media is not alarmingly high, but high
enough to conclude that they should not be under-
estimated or dismissed as a peripheral phenomenon.
Moreover, they might have to be considered relevant
actors with high mobilizing and polarizing potential
(Atkinson & Leon Berg, 2012). The fact that right-wing al-
ternative media that do not adhere to the ruleset of tra-
ditional journalism can gain such a vast reach is cause for
concern. This is especially relevant when contemplating
the strongest predictors of right-wing alternative news
consumption. The low level of trust in public service
broadcasting media, which are occasionally perceived as
government media, hints at an elite-critical stance and
needs to be further studied. The finding that politically in-
terested audiences who perceive immigration as a threat
to national cultures are turning to right-wing alternative
media is not surprising. After all, this is a central theme
for both radical right populist parties aswell as right-wing
alternative onlinemedia, as previously demonstrated, es-
pecially for Northern European countries . However, the
strength of this predictor, in combination with a gener-
ally skeptical assessment of traditional news sources, as
well as the once again confirmed high relevance of social
media platforms, call for further research into the distri-
bution mechanisms and the media effects of right-wing
alternative news content. After all, the results suggest
that right-wing alternative media might function as dis-
tributors and amplifiers of immigration-critical attitudes.
Altogether, the results indicate that right-wing alterna-
tive online media have to be considered influential fac-
tors for center-right to radical right-leaning politics and
audiences in public discourse.
The supplementary material of this article has been
uploaded to the Open Science Framework and is avail-
able via DOI, https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/ACZHF.
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